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Van Pala: The Narrow Scope of Federal Preemption of State Regulation in Com

THE NARROW SCOPE OF FEDERAL PREEMPTION OF STATE REGU LATION IN
COMMERCIAL CREDIT TRANSACTIONS:
A COMMENT ON DECOHENV CAPITAL ONE, N.A.
1.

INTRODUCTION

Congress's power to codify banking customs and practices, establish a
system of national banking. and provide national banks protections that prohibit
states from infringing on the efficiency of the banking system dates from the
seminal case of McCulloch v. Maryland and the enactment the National Bank
Act (NBA) in 1864.2 The United States Supreme Court announced the
preemption standard in Watters v. Wachovia Bank, NA.3 and emphasized that
federal control of the banking system "shields national banking from unduly
burdensome and duplicative state regulation," excepting only undiscriminating
state laws of general application.4 The federal policy of encouraging uninhibited
institutional banking practices at times conflicts with the duty of states to
safeguard consumers' rights in non-real estate lending transactions, and while
courts are hesitant to apply the presumption against preemption, traditional
theories of federal preemption provide little protection to national banks
operating under the scope of the NBA.
Last year, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit refused
to apply the doctrine of federal preemption and held that Maryland state law
required an assignee of a Retail Installment Sale Contract (RIC), which included
an optional debt cancellation agreement, to cancel the borrower's remaining loan
balance upon occurrence of a condition in the contract.6 After a close reading of
the NBA, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) regulations, and the
contract terms in question, the court conducted a detailed analysis of the
underlying transactions and found that the Maryland Credit Grantor Closed End
Provisions (CLEC), which governed the loan agreement, were not preempted
under the doctrines of express federal preemption, conflict preemption, or full

1. 17 U.S. 316 (1819).
2.
National Bank Act of June 3. 1864, ch. 106, 13 Stat. 100 (codified as amended at 12
U.S.C. §§ 21 216d (2006)); see also 12 U.S.C. § 25b (Supp. IV 2011) (clarifying preemption
standards).
3. 550 U.S. 1 (2007).
4.
Id. at 11 (citing Davis v. Elmira Sax. Bank, 161 U.S. 275. 290 (1896)).
5.
For an overview of federal preemption standards, see generally Raymond Natter & Katie
Wechsler. Dodd-FrankAct and National Bank Preemption: Much Ado About Nothing, 7 VA. L. &
Bus. REV. 301, 308-10 (2012). As for presumptions pertaining to preemption:
In general, the courts will apply a "presumption against preemption," especially in a
field which the states have traditionally occupied. The presumption grows out of the
Supreme Court's traditional "respect for the states as 'independent sovereigns in our
federal system' which leads to the assumption that 'Congress does not cavalierly preempt
state-law causes of action.'
Id. at 310 (quoting Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 565 n.3 (2009); Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518
U.S. 470, 485 (1996)).
6.
Decohen v. Capital One, N.A., 703 F.3d 216. 227, 228-29 (4th Cir. 2012).
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field preemption." Therefore, the court found that the CLEC required Capital
One-a national bank and an assignee of the original lender-to cancel the
borrower's remaining loan balance under the contract.8 Ultimately, the court
reinforced its recent decision in Epps v. JP Aorgan Chase Bank, N4., 9
demonstrating its unwillingness to invoke federal preemption doctrine and
signaling its support of state consumer protection measures.
11.

UNDERLYING TRANSACTIONS AND DISTRICT COURT OPINION

In September 2007, Philip Decohen purchased a vehicle from Nation Auto
and entered into an RIC with Nation Auto to finance the purchase. 10 The RIC
contained an optional debt cancellation agreement and a choice of law provision,
which designated the Maryland Commercial Code and, specifically, the CLEC as
the governing law.I Under the CLEC, debt cancellation agreements permit a
borrower to cancel the remaining balance of the borrower's loan, less any
insurance proceeds, if a "total loss" of the vehicle occurs.'1
The debt
cancellation agreement in Decohen's loan agreement permitted him to cancel

7.

Id. at 224.

8.

Id. at 229.

9.
675 F.3d 315 (4th Cir. 2012). In Epps, the court declined to apply the presumption
against federal preemption because "the CLEC regulates an area with authorized federal presence."
Id. at 322. However, the court found that "the degree to wvhich the CLEC regulates an enumerated
power of the national banks is merely incidental" and held that the NBA did not preempt state
CLEC repossession provisions. Id. at 322 23 (citing 12 C.F.R. § 7.4008(d)(1) (2011)). Further, the
court recognized that "national banks are subject to state law regarding collection of debts." Id. at
324.
10. Decohen, 703 F.3d at 219. Nation Auto's predecessor in interest was Abbasi, LLC, a
named defendant in the district court case. See Decohen v. Abbasi, LLC, No. WDQ- 10-3157, 2011
WL 3438625. at *I (D. Md. July 26. 2011). vacated in part sub nom. Decohen v. Capital One, N.A.,
703 F.3d 216 (4th Cir. 2012).
11. Decohen, 703 F.3d at 219. The RIC also contained a Federal Trade Commission "Holder
Notice" required under federal law. See id. (referring to holder notice required by 16 C.F.R. § 433.2
(2012)). The district court characterized the debt cancellation agreement as a "Guaranteed Asset
Protection Deficiency Waiver Addendum" (GAP Agreement), wlhich contained the following
relevant language:
The named Customer is responsible to the named Dealer/Assignee under the terms of the
[Credit Contract] for the amount of any early termination liability resulting from a Total
Loss of the Vehicle. Due to this addendum being in effect, the Dealer/Assignee agrees to
cancel a portion of the Customer's indebtedness in the event of a 'Total Loss of the
Vehicle as defined herein.
The [GAP Agreement] will pay the amount equal to the Unpaid Net Balance less the
Actual Cash Value (ACV) of the Vehicle both as defined herein.
Decohen, 2011 WL 3438625, at *1.
12. Decohen, 703 F.3d at 228-29 (citing MD. CODE. ANN., COM. LAw § 12-1001(h)
(LexisNexis 2005 & Supp. 2012)).
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only a portion of the debt owed rather than the entire balance of the loan and,
thus, failed to comply with the CLEC.
When Beacon Industries Worldwide, Inc.-the servicer of the agreementdenied Decohen's claim to rescind the loan, Decohen brought a putative class
action, alleging violations of the CLEC, Maryland Consumer Protection Act, and
Maryland Retail Installment Sales Act, and asserted claims for breach of
contract, declaratory relief, restitution, and unjust enrichment.14 The United
States District Court for the District of Maryland found that the NBA preempted
Decohen's CLEC claim; that Capital One's status as assignee, rather than
obligee, did not change the preemption analysis; and that, ultimately, the NBA
and CLEC did not require Capital One to rescind the loan.

111. FOURTH CIRCUIT APPEAL
4. The National Bank Act and State Credit Regulations
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit reviewed de novo the district court's grant of
Capital One's motion to dismiss and briefly recounted the history of the NBA
and Congress's power to reempt state laws that infringe on federally protected
rights of national banks.
The court then described the three types of federal
preemption: express preemption, conflict preemption, and field preemption.'
The court explicated the NBA and OCC regulations and, applying the plain

13. Id. at 219; see also Decohen, 2011 WL 3438625 at *1 ("The GAP Agreement ... stated
that it 'may not necessarily pay off the Unpaid Net Balance due by the customer' .
).
14. Decohen. 2011 WL 3438625, at *1-2 (citing MD. CODE ANN., CoM. LAW §§ 12-601636, 12-1001-1029, 13-101-501 (LexisNexis 2005 & Supp. 2012)). Capital One removed the case
to federal district court pursuant to the Class Action Fairness Act. Id. (citing 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332(d)(2), 1453 (2006 & Supp. IV 2010)).
15. Id. at *5-6 (citing OCC Interpretive Letter No. 1095 from Julie L. Williams, First Senior
Deputy Comptroller & Chief Counsel, Comptroller of the Currency Adn'r of Nat'l Banks, to Paul
D. Egide, Dir., Wisc. Dep't of Fin. Insts. (Feb. 27, 2008), available at http://www.occ.gov/
static/interpretations-and-precedents/mar08/intlO95.pdf).
The district court first found that the
parties had not entered into a true debt cancellation agreement not because it provided for the
cancellation of only a part of the remaining loan balance, but because the agreement impermissibly
provided that the actual cash value ofthe car would be its retail guide value. Id. at *3-4 (citing MD.
CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 12-1002(b) (LexisNexis 2005)). Thus, the court found that the agreement
in question was beyond the purview of the CLEC. Id. at *4. In granting Capital One's motion to
dismiss, the district court found that Decohen failed to state a claim for breach of contract and that
his other claims failed on the merits. Id at *5 & n. 10. However, the district court concluded that
Decohen's loan agreement did contain a debt cancellation agreement for purposes of the preemption
analysis. Id. at *6.
16. See Decohen, 703 F.3d at 222 23 (citations omitted).
17. Id. at 223. Express preemption occurs where "Congress expressly states its intent to
preempt state law." Id (citing Cox v. Shalala, 112 F.3d 151, 154 (4th Cir. 1997)). Full field
preemption occurs where "Congress occupies a certain filed by 'regulating so pervasively that there
is no room left for the states to supplement federal law.' Id. (quoting Cox, 112 F.3d at 154).
Finally. conflict preemption arises wvhen a "state law is preempted 'to the extent it actually conflicts
with federal law.' Id. (quoting Cox, 112 F.3d at 154).
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language of the regulations to the underlying transactions, concluded that federal
law did not preempt the CLEC under any of the three preemption standards.' 8
1. Express Preemption
At the time of the transaction, OCC regulations expressly preempted state
laws "that obstruct[ed], impair[ed], or condition[ed] a national bank's ability to
fully exercise its Federally authorized non-real estate lending powers" 19
regarding, most notably, state laws concerning
[t]he terms of credit, including the schedule for repayment of
principal and interest, amortization of loans, balance. payments due,
minimum payments, or term to maturity of the loan, including the
circumstances under which a loan may be called due and payable upon
the passage of time or a specified event external to the loan.
However, the NBA regulations include a sweeping "savings clause," which
permits state regulation on the subjects of contracts, rights to collect debts, and
the acquisition and transfer of property in non-real estate lending.) Further,
OCC regulations provide that federal law governs only debt cancellation
agreements that national banks enter into.
Federal law also governs debt
cancellation agreements in loans that national banks directly originate and loans
that national banks purchase from other lenders.23 Therefore, the threshold
question is whether a national bank at any time "entered into" a debt cancellation
agreement. 2 Thus, federal law would expressly preempt the CLEC only if
Capital One had directly "entered into" the debt cancellation agreement with
Decohen, either at the time of loan origination or at the time Capital One
purchased the loan from Nation Auto.
Here, the initial loan agreement between Decohen and Nation Auto, the
original lender, contained the debt cancellation agreement.26 Nation Auto
assigned the RIC, unaltered, to Capital One.
Therefore, Capital One, the

18. Id. at 223 25 (citations omitted).
19. 12 C.F.R. § 7.4008(d) (2011). Subsequently, the OCC removed this language in
implementing provisions of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act. See
Dodd-Frank Act Implementation, 76 Fed. Reg. 43,549, 43,556 (July 21, 2011) (codified at 12
C.F.R. § 7.4008(d) (2012)).
20. 12 C.F.R. § 7.4008(d)(4) (2012).
21. See id. § 7.4008(e).
22. See 12 C.F.R. § 37.1(c).
23. See id.; see also OCC Interpretive Letter No. 1095, supra note 15, at 3 ("[N]ational banks
are authorized to enter into [debt cancellation agreements] with respect to loans they purchase as
well as loans they originate directly.").
24. See 12 C.F.R. § 37. 1(c).
25. See Decohen v. Capital One, N.A., 703 F.3d 216, 224 (4th Cir. 2012).
26. See id.
27. Id.
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national bank seeking preemption of the CLEC, neither offered nor entered into
the debt cancellation agreement with Decohen. 8 Accordingly, the court found
that based on the plain language of the NBA and OCC regulations, taken
together with the facts of the underlying transactions, federal law did not
expressly preempt the CLEC.
2.

Conflict and FieldPreemption

Similarly, the court determined that although the CLEC allows the debtor to

cancel the "remaining" balance of the loan and the OCC regulations allow the
borrower to cancel "all or part of' the remaining debt, state law is not conflict
preempted by federal law.
Theoretically, a borrower could cancel the entire
remaining balance of her loan and be in compliance with both state and federal
law.3
Additionally, the court found that the federal policy supporting
uninhibited national banking practices remains intact; the CLEC "does not stand
as an obstacle to the objective of the federal law" because banks may enforce
loans in accordance with "safe and sound banking practices" while the state still
protects consumers' rights.
Thus, the CLEC does not conflict with federal
regulations.
The court then summarily concluded that Congress had not sufficiently
"occupied the field with regard to debt cancellation agreements."
Because
Congress had left room in the NBA for states to legislate on debt cancellation
agreements that entities other than national banks enter into, the NBA did not
preempt the CLEC under the doctrine of full field preemption.35
3.

4dditionalSources ofFederalPreemption

The Fourth Circuit panel concluded that the NBA did not preempt state law
because the CLEC is an undiscriminating law of general application-it does not
treat national banks differently from all other lending institutions.36 Unlike in

28. See id.
29. Id
30. Id at 224 25 (quoting MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 12-1001(h) (LexisNexis 2005 &
Supp. 2012); 12 C.F.R. § 37.2(f) (2012)).
31. See id. at 225.
32. Id (quoting 12 C.F.R. § 37. 1(b)).
33. Id. at 224.
34. Id. The district court had relied on persuasive authority in concluding that federal law
field preempts debt cancellation agreements because Congress provided a "'comprehensive scheme
of [federal] regulation [that] lea-ves no room for state law." Decohen v. Abbasi, LLC, No. WDQ10-3157, 2011 WL 3438625, at *6 (D. Md. July 26, 2011) (alteration in original) (quoting Spinelli
v. Capital One Bank, 265 F.R.D. 598, 605 (M.D. Fla. 2009)), vacated in part sub nom. Decohen v.
Capital One, N.A., 703 F.3d 216 (4th Cir. 2012).
35. CapitalOne, 703 F.3d at 224.
36. See id. at 226 (quoting Statement of John D. Hawke. Jr., Comptroller of the Currency,
Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous. & Urban Affairs, on Federal Preemption of State Laws,
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Epps, the Decohen court failed to acknowledge that the NBA's savings clause
expressly excepts the CLEC from federal preemption as a law regulating
contracts, debt collection, and the acquisition and transfer of property.37
In
Epps, the court specifically relied on the explicit language in the savings clause
to excuse state laws of general application from federal preemption.3
In
contrast, the Decohen court merely cited its previous decision in Epps and
resolved the case instead on common law and public policy grounds.39 The court
concluded that nondiscriminatory state laws regarding contracts, debt collection,
and the acquisition and transfer of property, like the CLEC, "form the legal
infrastructure" for banking practices and regulate all creditors-whether an
obligee or assignee, or a national or local entity-operating within the state.40
Moreover, the court opined that state laws of general application do not frustrate
the federal interest in uninhibited national banking practices and that preemption
would not further federal banking policy.41
Capital One argued that federal law should preempt the CLEC even though
Capital One acquired the loan by assignment.42 In particular, Capital One argued
that banking institutions customarily obtain rights to payment by virtue of
assignments; stringent state regulation requiring banks to cancel lucrative
payment streams would curtail future fruitful lending and trading practices.43
The court rejected Capital One's arguments-and the district court's holding-in
finding that assignments necessarily alter the preemption analysis.44 Further, the
court held that assigning a loan to a national bank does not "cleanse" an
underlying unlawful transaction.'5 The court reasoned that because Capital One
must already comply with state usury and consumer protection laws regarding
contracts, debt collection, and the acquisition and transfer of property rights,
allowing the CLEC to control the present case would not unduly burden the
bank.46
Throughout its opinion, the Fourth Circuit endorsed Maryland's

4ashington, D.C., April 7, 2004, 23 OCC Q.J. 69, 71 (Sept. 2004) [hereinafter Statement ofJohn D.
Hawke, Jr.]), Epps v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., 675 F.3d 315, 320 (4th Cir. 2012) (quoting
Watters v. Wachovia Bank. N.A.. 550 U.S. 1. 11 (2007)).
37. See Epps, 675 F.3d at 325 (discussing the savings clause of 12 C.F.R. § 7.4008 (2012)).
38. Id. at 325 26 (citing 12 C.F.R. § 7.4008(e)).
39. See Decohen, 703 F.3d at 226 27 (citations omitted).
40. Id. at 226 (quoting Statement ofJohn D. Hawke. Jr.. supra note 36, at 71).
41. See id. at 225-26 (citations omitted).
42. See id. at 225. Capital One specifically relied on the decision in Aguayo v L.S. Bank,
658 F. Supp. 2d 1226 (S.D. Cal. 2009), rev 'd. 653 F.3d 912 (9th Cir. 2011), for its policy arguments
and for the proposition that Nation Auto's assignment should not alter the preemption analysis. See
Decohen, 703 F.3d at 226.
43. See Decohen, 703 F.3d at 226.
44. Id. at 225.
45. Id. at 227. The court noted that the Eighth Circuit, in Thomas v. (US.Bank N.A.. 575
F.3d 794 (8th Cir. 2009), supported its contention that lenders and creditors cannot cleanse an
illegal transaction by assigning a loan to a national bank. Decohen, 703 F.3d at 228 (citing Thomas,
575 F.3d at 800-01).
46. See Decohen. 703 F.3d at 226.
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consumer protection code and implied the federal government's respect for
states' expertise in governing non-real estate loan transactions.
B. Breach of ContractClaim
Finally, the court addressed the substance of Decohen's claims and found
that Decohen and Nation Auto freely bargained for the CLEC choice of law
provision.48 Under Maryland law, the debt cancellation agreement was illegal
because it provided that the borrower could cancel only a portion of the
remaining debt, upon the occurrence of a contractual condition.
Thus, since
Capital One voluntarily assumed the terms of the loan agreement by accepting
the assignment from the original lender, Capital One could not escape a suit for
breach of contract merely because it did not directly enter into the loan
transaction.
Accordingly, the court vacated the district court's judgment and
held that the NBA and OCC regulations did not preempt the CLEC. Based on
the illegality of the underlying transaction, the court also found that Decohen
established a claim for breach of contract.

IV. CONCLUSION
Decohen cannot be cited as a landmark federal preemption case. Rather,
Decohen may stand for the rule that in activity conducted after contract
formation, national banks may no longer clutch the shield of federal preemption.
The key language in the OCC regulations means that, at the time of contract
formation, national banks are immune from suits based on state contract claims
or unfair debt practices actions for debt cancellation agreements they "enter[]
into." 5 However, after contract formation, state law may govern execution and
other related contract activities.
Thus, national banks would no longer be
immune from post-formation suits brought pursuant to state consumer protection
laws.
Once contracts including debt cancellation agreements have been
consummated, national banking practice should resume its normal course, and

47. Additionally, the court further developed the policy rationales underlying its previous
opinion in Epps. See id. (citing Epps v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., 675 F.3d 315, 318, 326 (4th
Cir. 2012)). While the court in Eps refused to apply the presumption against preemption, it found
that state usury laws are not conflict preempted by the NBA and OCC regulations. Epps, 675 F.3d
at 322. 324.
48. See Decohen, 703 F.3d at 228.
49. See id at 219.
50. See id. at 228 ("The assignment of the loan by Nation Auto to Capital One does not allow
Capital One to escape the obligations Nation Auto voluntarily undertook.").
51. See id. at 227, 229.
52. Id. at 229.
53. See 12 C.F.R. §37.1(c) (2012).
54. See supra notes 25, 40-41 and accompanying text.
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institutions such as Capital One may continue collections operations pursuant to
their status as assignees to the original loan transactions. Regardless, national
banks do not require federal protection while executing installment sales
contracts already sanctioned by federal law at their inception.
Although the Fourth Circuit has been unwilling to apply the presumption
against federal preemption of state law,55 the court will methodically apply the
doctrine of federal preemption based on a close reading of the federal statutes at
issue and a careful analysis of the underlying transactions. Most notably, the
court's holding in Decohen signals that the federal government respects the
authority of the states to legislate and protect consumers' rights, especially in
areas traditionally relegated to the states.
TanaraMary Van Pala

55.
56.

See Epps v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., 675 F.3d 315, 321-22 (4th Cir. 2012).
See Decohen. 703 F.3d at 222-27 (citations omitted).
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